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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME 60 NUMBER 3 1982
THE TYRRELL WILLIAMS MEMORIAL
LECTURE
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture was established in 1948 by the
family and friends of Tyrrell Williams, a distinguished member of the
faculty of the Washington University School of Law from 1913-1946.
Since its inception, the Lectureship has provided a forum for the discus-
sion of issues signo/cant to the legal community. Former Tyrrell Williams
Lecturers include some of the nation's most distinguished legal scholars,
judges, and practicing attorneys.
The Honorable Irving P, Kaufman, distinguished jurist and scholar,
delivered the Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture on March 24, 1982, on
the campus of Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri Thefollow-
ing article is an expanded version of that lecture.
THE CHILD IN TROUBLE: THE LONG AND
DIFFICULT ROAD TO REFORMING THE
CRAZY-QUILT JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Irving R. Kaufman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Like the Gordian knot, the problems affecting youth in our society
have been unyielding. Attempts to unravel the tangled skein of diffi-
culties facing troubled children have not yet provided systematic solu-
* Judge of the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; Chief Judge of that court
from 1973 to 1980; Chairman, IJA-ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards.
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tions to child abuse and juvenile crime. Helpless at birth, slow to
mature, children obviously need protection and nurturing for a long
time.' Recognizing that children develop best when raised by their
parents,2 and that there are many approaches to raising children, 3 soci-
ety has acknowledged that parents should have primary responsibility
for providing protection and guidance. Accordingly, society's rules
governing state intervention to correct problems such as abuse and ne-
glect of children have long been characterized in theory by a preference
for family autonomy.4
We have failed, however, to integrate our understanding of the fund-
mentals of effective child-rearing into a framework of rules that would
permit the state to intervene. A near epidemic of child abuse and ne-
glect5 is evidence of the limitations of a policy favoring unrestricted
family automony. At the same time, where the state has ventured to
help abused or neglected children, juvenile authorities have too fre-
quently unjustifiably interfered with families in pursuit of an illusory
rehabilitative ideal.6
The failures of our antiquated juvenile justice system extend far be-
yond our inability to remedy the problem of child abuse. Like King
Canute who stood on the shore commanding the waves to cease pound-
ing, reformers have been helpless to stem the tide of juvenile crime.7
Juvenile offenders today are younger than their predecessors and are
committing more violent offenses.
A recent study in The New York Times on juvenile crime noted a
most striking case. Harold "Pee Wee" Brown began his life of crime at
the age of five when he was truant from kindergarten for three months.
When he attended, he terrorized his peers and robbed them of their
lunch money. The violence of his crimes grew, and between the ages of
eleven and fifteen Pee Wee was arrested fifteen times on charges rang-
1. Wald, Book Review, 78 MICH. L. REv. 645, 645 (1980).
2. Id
3. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Developments in the Law-The Constilulion
and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156, 1351 (1980) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
4. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JOINT
COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NE-
GLECT 1.1 (1981) [hereinafter IJA/ABA STANDARDS].
5. See infra text accompanying notes 13-14.
6. Kaufman, Book Review, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1052, 1059 (1977). For a discussion of the
"rehabilitative ideal," see F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-41 (1964).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 10-12.
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ing from assault to sodomy. Pee Wee willingly admitted that these ar-
rests were for only a small number of his crimes. Indeed, he claimed
that when he was thirteen he shot and killed a man on a deserted
Brooklyn street corner but was never caught. Now twenty, he is serv-
ing a prison term for another murder.
Every day the media graphically recounts tragic stories of violent
crimes committed by minors-a fourteen-year-old who shot an eight-
een-year-old to death after the latter refused to relinquish his $150.00
gold ring; a seventeen-year-old who murdered a man shortly after the
youth was released from custody on the recommendation of psychia-
trists and social workers, despite his history of emotional disturbance
and juvenile crime. Instances such as these fall within the ambit of the
juvenile courts, which are overwhelmed by a mountain of cases involv-
ing youthful offenders.
Courts have responsibilities concerning children in addition to
resolving cases of juvenile crime and child abuse. In child custody
cases, judges often confront difficult jurisdictional issues as well as the
conflicting interests of the child and his parents when divorce requires a
realignment of the parents' custodial rights.' These cases often require
great resourcefulness on the part of judges. In one recent case, the
judge decided that it would be unfair to award custody of the children
exclusively to either parent. Accordingly, the children remained in the
family home, and the parents alternated living with the children. The
well-publicized case of Walter Polovchak, a fourteen-year-old boy,
provides another telling illustration of these issues. Polovchak turned
to the courts for relief after running away from home in Chicago rather
than returning with his parents to the Soviet Union. Local authorities
supported Walter, and the Carter Administration granted him asylum.
The Reagan Administration renewed Washington's pledge to Walter.
Recently, an Illinois appellate court reversed a lower court's ruling
which made Walter a ward of the Cook County Juvenile Court. The
appellate court decided that because Walter was not in any physical or
mental danger,9 the state had violated the Polovchaks' civil rights by
intervening in the internal affairs of the family. It is true that few cus-
tody cases involve such high political stakes. Yet all of them are mat-
ters of equally intense personal concern, and the courts in every case
8. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1314.
9. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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must strike a delicate balance among the interests of the child, the par-
ents, and the State.
These few cases are not isolated incidents. Since 1960, arrests of
juveniles for violent crimes have increased by nearly 250%, more than
double the comparable figure for adults during the same period.' 0
While children under the age of eighteen constitute only 14.6% of the
nation's population, they account for more than 50% of all arrests for
property crime." In the schoolhouse, where'68% of the robberies and
50% of the assaults on youths between the ages of twelve and fifteen
occur, an estimated 282,000 students and 5,200 teachers are physically
attacked each month. 2 During the 1974-75 school year, officials con-
fiscated sixty-five weapons in New York City schools. In 1980-81, that
number rose to 433, and the reign of terror in the schools proves that
this is only a small fraction of the weapons these youths actually
possess.
In their innocent role, juveniles fare no better than other victimized
groups in society. Children who are the victims of abuse and neglect
constantly fall through the cracks of the juvenile bureaucracy. More
than 500,000 cases of child abuse are reported annually, and authorities
estimate that at least 1.5 million more incidents go unreported. Incest
remains an intractable problem, shattering in its consequences and
often nearly impossible to detect. Furthermore, children enmeshed in
child-custody battles await what may be the most significant decision in
their lives. Such battles have become increasingly frequent, as the pro-
portion of marriages ending in divorce has reached 40%.3 Because the
family "imparts ethical norms, providing the child with his first instruc-
tion in the prevailing social rules, [and] profoundly shapes his charac-
10. Kaufman, supra note 6, at 1053. See general, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON
VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT, 81-85 (1981). This study indicates that juveniles commit more
than 20% of the violent crimes against individuals. Statistics for the urban ghetto and for schools
are particularly disheartening. Gang violence creates an atmosphere of terror in many poor
neighborhoods. The Attorney General's Task Force estimated that disruptive youth groups may
involve as many as 20% of adolescent males in cities of more than 10,000 population and that 71%
of all serious crimes by youths are committed by gang members. Id at 84.
11. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT, supra note
10, at 81.
12. Id
13. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, Series P-23, No. 84, DIVORCE,
CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT I (1979). In 1978 there were 2.2 million marriages and 1.1
million divorces. Id
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ter,"' 4 failings of courts in the child custody area exacerbate other
social problems, such as child abuse and juvenile criminality.
In this article, I will outline a comprehensive approach toward re-
forming the juvenile justice system to enable it to better serve the needs
of society and the child. To structure the inquiry that follows, I will
briefly describe the major themes which run through all these cases,
and which must be understood if meaningful and comprehensive re-
form is to be undertaken.
In cases involving juveniles, courts are confronted with the tensions
among the rights of the child, the rights of parents, and the interests of
the state. These conflicts are heightened when our concern focuses on
safeguarding the rights of minors because the very concept of a right
presupposes that we can describe its source and nature, determine how
it can be enforced, and define its boundaries. 5 For example, it is
meaningless to say that children have an absolute right to control their
own destiny, or make basic decisions involving fundamental liberties
because children also need special protection' 6 and may not always
have the maturity to assert their own rights. While courts have long
held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty in cases involving
adults,' 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
a recent case, upheld restrictions imposed by the State of New York on
the right of minors to marry without parental consent.'8 As a result,
the child's right to any specific form of treatment by the state must be
shaped in light of the parents' traditional right to custody and control
of their child.'9 As we shall see, this parental right has assumed consti-
tutional dimension.20 Yet parents often fail to live up to society's ex-
pectations, and society has both an interest, as parens patriae, in
14. C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD 3 (1977), cited in Developments in the Law,
supra note 3, at 1159.
15. Kaufman, Protecting the Rights of Minors: On Juvenile Autonomy and the Limits of Law,
52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1977).
16. Wald, supra note 1, at 645. But see R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974) (asserting that soci-
ety's protective attitude toward children is ill-advised, since children mature when given individ-
ual liberty and responsibility, not protection and sheltering).
17. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage is a fundamental privacy
right protected by the due process clause of the United States Constitution); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (antimiscegenation statute infringed constitutionally protected right to marry).
18. Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982).
19. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 170 (1944).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 93-98.
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ensuring that a child receives adequate care2' and an interest in main-
taining social order.2
Another correlative principle is at work. The rights of a child require
special protection because they belong to a person generally considered
unable to assert them.23 But disability by reason of youth may not
alone justify state intervention in the best interests of the child, since
there are different levels of maturity and degrees of disability. Even in
difficult cases in which the individual juvenile is immature or the
choice is highly significant, a child should still have the right to be free
from state intervention, provided that the child's choice can be made by
a surrogate decisionmaker-such as a parent-whose interests track
those of the minor. 4 The corollary of this principle is that different
levels of protection by the state will be required depending on the na-
ture of the child's right, with more stringent protections required for
individuals where it is likely that the interests of the parents and child
will conflict.25
An additional theme that emerges is the need to focus on the family,
our society's primary institution for developing a child's potential. 6
The risk of antisocial behavior by the child increases when the family is
unsuccessful in, or prevented from, providing the essential framework
for the child's growth. Attention to that reality calls for what I have
labeled a "new pragmatism,"27 whose fundamental tenets are that
(1) coercive intrusion into the life of the child and the automony of the
family requires sound justification; and (2) intervention is ineffective
and may be harmful, if not designed to integrate the juvenile into his
family and the social fabric. The family must be convinced that the
state's involvement is essential to the process of rehabilitation.2 8
From what I have said it would appear that still another theme must
21. See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child- A Reappraisal of the State's Role in
Child Neglect andAbuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887, 893-910 (1975).
22. See id; S. KATz, WHEN PARENTS FAIL (1971); Wald, supra note 1, at 646.
23. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1756 (1981).
24. IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, Introduction to Standards Relating to Rights of
Minors, at 1-6 (1980); Kaufman, supra note 15, at 1021.
25. See generally Garvey, supra note 23.
26. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 45 (1967); Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1159.
27. Kaufman, supra note 6, at 1055.
28. HA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, A Summary and Analysis 23 (Tent. ed. 1977). See
also Kaufman, Prison Reform: .4 View From the Bench, 67 A.B.A. J. 1470, 1471 (1981).
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be recognized. I refer to the overriding need to undertake a sweeping
restructuring of the existing juvenile justice system. Reform must be
based on the fundamental premise that the prescription of treatment or
services by juvenile authorities is not inherently beneficial to the juve-
nile and should be utilized with restraint.29 Institutionalization, much
closer to punishment than to treatment, must not masquerade as reha-
bilitation. Accordingly, I will detail a variety of fundamental changes
in the framework of the juvenile justice system which could take us a
long way down the road to needed reforms. It will become clear that
the central shortcoming in our efforts to help the child in trouble is the
absence of a comprehensive system with centralized authority over all
aspects of the child's interaction with the law. In this connection, I will
suggest proposals for unifying the system's remedial efforts and elimi-
nating gaps and duplication in services. The linchpin of this compre-
hensive reform would be the creation of a coordinating organization,
requiring, as a first step in each case, the assignment ofjuvenile cases to
trained impartial overseers whose focus will be the rehabilitation of the
family.30
Reform for the future requires an understanding of the past. Ac-
cordingly, a brief history of society's approach to juvenile justice will
provide insight into the reasons for the current shortcomings of the sys-
tem and the necessary direction for reform.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
.4. Pre-Nineteenth Century
Before the reform movement of the nineteenth century, juveniles
who were not accused of committing crimes, but were vagrants or with-
out adequate homes were dealt with pursuant to practices that were the
historical vestiges of the Elizabethan poor law system. These children
were placed in poorhouses and almshouses, and treated as indentured
servants.31 Children accused of committing crimes were dealt with by
the same institutions having jurisdiction over adults, although modified
rules of criminal responsibility were applied for the adolescent. If
29. IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, A Summary and Analysis 23 (Tent. ed. 1977).
30. See infra text accompanying pt. IV, B.
31. See J. HAWES, CHILDREN IN URBAN SOCIETY: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA (1971).
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found guilty, juveniles were incarcerated in prisons along with adult
offenders. In short, the rudimentary efforts of pre-nineteenth century
society to address the problems of the juvenile were characterized by a
sharp separation between the child as criminal and the child as the vic-
tim of poverty or abusive parents.32
B. Nineteenth Century
The reform movements of the nineteenth century brought significant
changes in the juvenile justice system. In 1825, the New York legisla-
ture founded the New York House of Refuge to care for 'novices in
antisocial conduct. '3 3 Locking juvenile criminals and so-called "status
offenders," such as vagrants, behind the same bars was justified by a
philosophy that traced the causes of all types of juvenile problems to
poverty and social deprivation. This philosophy and the failure to dis-
tinguish between delinquent and neglected children34 came to justify a
drive to impose middle-class values upon the children in trouble, who
were often the offspring of recent immigrants.
While this social welfare objective provided social and political justi-
fication, the theoretical justification for subjecting delinquent children
to coercive state commitment was provided by the parens patriae doc-
trine. The parens patriae power had come to signify the state's limited
paternalistic power to protect or promote the welfare of certain individ-
uals, like young children, who lacked the capacity to act in their own
best interests.3 6
Early nineteenth century courts invoked the parens patriae doctrine
to uphold broad child neglect and delinquency statutes that permitted
sweeping state-initiated intervention into the family.37 Furthermore,
these statutes generally contained vague substantive standards, and in-
.sufficient procedural safeguards such as parental notice and opportu-
32. See W. FRIEDLANDER, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL WELFARE (3rd ed. 1968).
33. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform; An HistoricalPersective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187
(1970); Marks, Juvenile Noncriminal Misbehavior and Equal Protection, 13 FAM. L.Q. 461, 462
(1980).
34. See Fox, supra note 33, at 1192-93; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1225.
35. See Fox, supra note 33, at 1201-02.
36. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1207-22 (1974). Beginning in Pennsylvania in 1838, courts invoked the parens patriae con-
cept to justify the confinement of minors in a House of Refuge. See Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9
(Pa. 1838).
37. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1222-23.
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nity to be heard.38 Moreover, because the statutes did not distinguish
the state's power to remove neglected or dependent children from their
families from the power to incarcerate delinquent minors, the courts
could not accurately assess the state's interest in intervention in any
particular case. Accordingly, the courts failed to appreciate that in
cases of neglect or dependency, where the child had not committed an
antisocial act, the state's sole objective should have been promotion of
the child's best interests. 9
Because of the many serious abuses, nineteenth century humanitari-
ans lobbied for reform that culminated in the passage of The Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of 1899.40 The Illinois Act, which established the
first separate juvenile court in America, became the model for similar
enactments in many other states. On first examination, it appears that
the Act contained many provisions that would protect the rights of the
juvenile, including establishment of a court for juveniles under age six-
teen and separation of children from adult convicts confined in the
same institution."a The Act also contained a provision, however, au-
thorizing the court "to hear and dispose of the case in a summary man-
ner."42 In essence, this Act, coupled with the broad reach of the parens
patriae doctrine, gave the juvenile court judge almost limitless
discretion.
C Twentieth Century
Beginning early in the twentieth century, a number of changes took
place in the juvenile justice system. The jurisdiction of the juvenile
court was gradually expanded. For example, states added noncriminal
behavior-such as truancy-to the definition of delinquency. As a re-
sult, according to Anthony Platt, a noted expert in the field, juvenile
court legislation "brought within the ambit of governmental control a
set of youthful activities that had been previously ignored or handled
38. See id at 1224-25.
39. See id at 1225-26 & 1226 n.170. In acting pursuant to its parens patriae power, the state
should advance only the best interests of the individual requiring state assistance and should not
attempt to further other objectives deriving from the police power that may be antagonistic to the
individual's welfare. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
40. Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131-37 (no constitutional basis for confining other-
wise harmless mentally ill).
41. For a discussion of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, see Fox, supra note 33, at 1211.
42. Illinois Juvenile Court Act § 5, 1899 I11. Laws 133 (1899) (repealed 1965). See Fox, supra
note 33, at 1221.
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informally .... drinking, begging, roaming the streets, frequenting
dance halls and movies, fighting, sexuality, staying out late at night,
and incorrigibility. .. .
In an attempt to eliminate the stigma attaching to juveniles adjudi-
cated guilty of noncriminal misconduct, legislatures sought to create a
separate classification for juveniles engaging in such conduct known as
status offense jurisdiction. The New York legislature led the way with
the creation of the classification known as PINS, or Person in Need of
Supervision.' Other states followed suit. Yet this innovation did not
solve the basic problem. Whether labeled a criminal or status offender,
the adolescent found guilty bore a stigma, and correctional authorities
and other experts could not devise appropriate remedies.
It became increasingly urgent to reform the juvenile justice system,
and the cry for reform was nearly universal. This pressing need moved
the Supreme Court to make an effort to change the system through due
process guarantees. In 1966, in Kent v. United States,45 the Court held
that transfers from juvenile to adult court must be procedurally fair,
and the following year, in In re Gault,46 the Court held that juveniles
accused of crimes have a right to certain minimum safeguards as a mat-
ter of due process.
Although improvements have been made,47 the long history of
abuses in the juvenile justice system has left us with a legacy of injus-
tices: vague statutory standards; jurisdiction based on status or age
rather than specific acts; indiscriminate intervention into the family
and removal of children from the home; indeterminate and dispropor-
tionate sanctions; a "cure" prescribed without any understanding of the
"illness"; and a lack of coordination among the participants in the
process.4
8
Consider for a moment the state of the New York Family Court.
43. A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 139 (2d ed. 1977),
cied in Garlock, "Wayward" Children and the Law, 1820-1900. The Genesis ofthe Status Offense
Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, 13 GA. L. REV. 341, 344 (1979).
44. New York Family Court Act § 712(b) (McKinney 1962).
45. 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
46. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
47. For example, many courts have attempted to describe the types of constitutionally per-
missible environment that institutions must provide when juveniles are confined. See, e.g.,
Morales v. Turman, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
48. See HA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, A Summary and Analysis 36 (Tent. ed. 1977).
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Inadequately financed and understaffed-its twenty-eight judges are
eleven short of the statutorily authorized thirty-nine-the court must
handle tens of thousands of cases each year in such areas as juvenile
delinquency, child support, paternity, and abuse and neglect. Many of
the support personnel, law clerks, secretaries and others, are demoral-
ized and are eager to be transferred. Many of the lawyers who practice
before the court are considered to be among the most ineffective in
New York City. Overwhelmed by the crushing caseload, the judges
find it necessary to grant innumerable delays and dismiss as many as
one-third of the cases. I will attempt to sketch the outlines of a compre-
hensive approach to restructuring the juvenile justice system, based on
constitutional, statutory, and institutional reforms.
III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The nature of the constitutional protections to which the juvenile has
a right has long been the subject of heated debate.49 While most com-
mentators have focused on the procedural safeguards required by the
due process clause in juvenile proceedings,5" the Constitution also
places broad constraints on the substantive provisions of the juvenile
justice system.5 The articulation of constitutional principles to govern
attempts by the state to regulate juvenile behavior, or to decide which
parent should have custody of a child is a most difficult enterprise.
While the procedural safeguards applicable to juvenile proceedings can
be adopted by reference to the procedures governing adult criminal
proceedings, state attempts to regulate noncriminal misbehavior or to
make custody decisions must be guided by two principles: first, chil-
dren under a certain age are incapable of making decisions in their own
best interests, and second, such governmental intervention does impli-
cate the interests of child, parent, and state.52 As we shall see, while the
49. See, eg., Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of, In, and For Children, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 118; Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifcations, and Conclusive Pre-
sumbptions: Three Linked Riddles, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 8.
50. See, e.g., Davis, The Efficacy of a Probable Cause Requirement in Juvenile Proceedings, 59
N.C.L. REv. 723 (1981); Note, Preadjudicatory Confessions and Consent Searches: Placing the Ju-
venile on the Same Constitutional Footing as an Adult, 57 B.U.L. REv. 778 (1977); Note, Violent
Juveniles: The New York Courts and the Constitution, 11 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 51 (1979).
51. See Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme
Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 769, 770 (1978); Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at
123542.
52. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1161-66, 1198-1227; Garvey, supra note 51,
at 771.
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articulation of basic constitutional rights is an essential framework,
other reforms are necessary to structure a fair and workable juvenile
justice system.
.4 Procedural Due Process
One source of constitutional restrictions on state laws affecting
juveniles is procedural due process. In the area of juvenile delin-
quency, the courts have held that adolescents have a right to certain
minimum procedural safeguards. In In re Gault,53 the Supreme Court
held that juveniles facing possible incarceration as a result of delin-
quency charges have a constitutional right to notice, counsel, and cross-
examination, and a privilege against self-incrimination.54
The Court reaffirmed the validity of Gault in later cases, holding that
the standard of proof of guilt used in adult criminal trials-proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt-must also be used in juvenile delinquency
proceedings whenever the minor is subject to incarceration.55 The
Court also held that the double jeopardy clause prevents prosecution in
criminal court after an adjudication in juvenile court.5 6 Gault and its
progeny might then be taken to stand for the principle that an individ-
ual's interest in procedural safeguards for his or her liberty interest is
neither age-dependent, nor deserving of less stringent protection if he
or she is a minor.
53. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
54. Id. at 31-57. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1227-28.
55. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970).
56. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
543-51 (1971) (full range of protections applicable in adult criminal proceedings-in this case, the
sight to a jury trial for delinquency charges-is not required in juvenile proceedings).
57. See Garvey, supra note 51, at 775. The argument has been made that the special charac-
teristics of the juvenile mean that he or she has a reduced liberty interest meriting protection in the
form of procedural safeguards. It is also argued that it is less intrusive to control a child's behav-
ior than an adult's, because the child normally has less latitude to determine his or her own ac-
tions in our society than an adult. Accordingly, it is argued that a child is less likely to perceive a
deprivation of liberty to be offensive than an adult. Even if the child did not perceive coercive
intervention as a deprivation of liberty, a most unlikely result in the case of incarceration, parents
would undoubtedly be troubled by the state's intrusion into the affairs of their family. It must be
remembered that the parents also have a protectible interest in the fair adjudication of any charges
against their child which could result in the loss of custody. See id, at 776. In Gault, the Supreme
Court stated that notice of the charges against the juvenile must be provided, in large part, be-
cause the "parents' right to his custody [is] at stake." 387 U.S. at 33-34. Pursuant to Gault, the
state must notify the parents and the child of the right to counsel, a right shared by parent and
child. Id. at 41-42. Finally, Gault instituted another procedural safeguard by holding that a
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination depends not only upon the age and competence
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/2
MEMORIAL LECTURE
The state cannot avoid providing basic procedural protections by as-
suming that juvenile authorities' actions "in the child's best interest"
cannot cause the child to suffer the same degree of harm flowing from
adult criminal proceedings. While separate juvenile courts were origi-
nally established in large part to avoid the stigma attaching to the im-
position of the adult criminal sanctions, it cannot be disputed that
serious consequences attend adjudication of a child as a juvenile delin-
quent. In addition to the psychological effects and stigma of being la-
beled a delinquent, a child may later be denied employment
opportunities because employers may gain access to records of juvenile
proceedings. If the child is incarcerated, emotional and intellectual de-
velopment may be seriously impaired by the conditions of juvenile in-
stitutions. Accordingly, the child's liberty interest, joined with the
parents' interest in controlling their children's upbringing, warrants the
safeguards mandated by procedural due process in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings.
Gault and its offspring suggest that courts should "candidly ap-
praise" the state's assertion of the parens patriae power to deny minors
procedural safeguards in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The
child's interest in avoiding unjustified state intervention and the par-
ents' interest in maintaining family integrity indicate that parental ter-
mination or abuse and neglect proceedings also merit stringent
procedural due process protections. While the Supreme Court has not
applied the panoply of the Gault protections to such proceedings," sev-
eral lower courts have held that a minor who is the subject of a parental
termination proceeding has a right to certain procedural safeguards.59
Recently, however, the Supreme Court indicated that it may be reluc-
tant to require the same degree of protections mandated in the juvenile
delinquency context in other types of cases involving children.
In 1979, the Court in Parham v. JR. ,6 held that children who are
of the child, but also on "the presence and competence of parents." Id. at 55. The procedural due
process protections of the fourteenth amendment mandate procedural safeguards in juvenile de-
linquency proceedings, then, because it is recognized that both the interests of parent and child
have the same objective--the fair adjudication of charges against the juvenile.
58. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (no absolute right to
counsel in parental termination proceedings).
59. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Ricketts v. Ricketts, 576
S.W.2d 932 (Ark. 1979). See generaly Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Pro-
tecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 565
(1976).
60. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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wards of the state have no constitutional right to a formal hearing upon
being voluntarily admitted to a mental institution by a state agency.6'
While conceding that the child has a substantial liberty interest in not
being committed wrongly or unnecessarily to a mental institution,62 the
Court seemed to accord less weight to this interest than to the interest
of a child in avoiding incarceration as a juvenile delinquent.63 The
Court reasoned that the denial of a formal hearing for minors prior to
commitment was justified by "the statutory presumption that the State
acts in the child's best interest."64 Since the best interests standard gov-
erns most state abuse and neglect proceedings, one could fear that the
Court would adopt the same deferential approach in a case involving
the question of what safeguards due process requires in these
proceedings.
The Supreme Court has mandated at least one form of stringent pro-
tection in dependency and neglect proceedings. In many states, the
standard of proof the state must meet in a dependency and neglect pro-
ceeding has been the preponderance of the evidence.6 This standard is
much less protective than the standard applied to juvenile proceedings
in In re Winship ,66 which held that the state must prove its charges
beyond a reasonable doubt. Recently, the Supreme Court in Santosky
v. Kramer,67 declared that a New York law permitting the state to re-
move children permanently from the custody of abusive or neglectful
parents upon a showing of a "fair preponderance of the evidence" was
unconstitutional. The Court ruled that due process requires the state to
support its allegations by at least "clear and convincing evidence. ' 68 In
light of the child's and parents' interests in avoiding unnecessary state
61. Id. at 613.
62. Id. at 600. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1230.
63. 442 U.S. at 600-01.
64. Id at 618. In Parham, the court applied the tripartite balancing test of Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), to determine what process was required in a precommitment
formal hearing. The Matthews test called for a weighing of the child's interest, the risk of error
and the degree of additional accuracy to be gained from procedural safeguard, and the state's
interest in reducing its administrative costs. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 606. The Court con-
cluded that the risk of mistake in having the child committed by a social worker without a hearing
was too insignificant to warrant additional safeguards. Id at 613-17.
65. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-22.10 (1976); Comment, Due Process and the
Fundamental Right to Family Integrity A Re-Evaluation of South Dakota's Parental Termination
Statute, 24 S.D.L. Rev. 447, 460 (1979).
66. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
67. 50 U.S.L.W. 4333 (March 24, 1982).
68. Id at 4339.
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intervention, the Court correctly held that the more stringent proce-
dural due process protections should apply in abuse and neglect
proceedings.
Procedural safeguards alone are but empty vessels when the underly-
ing substantive rules affecting a child's liberty in juvenile delinquency
proceedings or the termination of his association with his parents in
abuse and neglect proceedings are vague and overbroad. For this rea-
son, it is important to consider whether heightened protection may be
afforded the rights of children and parents against state intervention
into the family through other types of constitutional limitations on state
parens patriae laws. I refer to the void-for-vagueness doctrine69 and
substantive due process.
. Voidfor Vagueness
Today many state delinquency and neglect statutes contain broad
and vague standards allowing juvenile courts nearly unbridled discre-
tion to intervene in the family and the life of the juvenile. More than
thirty states have statutes which authorize juvenile courts to determine
custody with no more guidance than when custody would be in the
"best interests of the child."7 Abuse and neglect and noncriminal mis-
behavior statutes are often equally vague.7"
The vague provisions of these statutes permit excessive interference
69. The void-for-vagueness doctrine was originally applied only to test the constitutionality
of penal statutes. In Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), the Supreme Court
stated that a statute "which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law." Id at 391. The vagueness doctrine was subse-
quently extended to nonpenal statutes in Giacelo v. Pennsylvania, in which the Court held that the
doctrine would apply when a statute deprived an individual of his liberty or property, whether the
statute was labeled as criminal or civil. 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966). See Comment, supra note 65.
The state delinquency and neglect statutes that were passed in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries contained broad and vague jurisdictional clauses enabling the juvenile courts to hear all
types of cases involving children deemed in need of state supervision. See Developments in the
Lam. Nupra note 3, at 1231 & n.202.
70. See Developments in the Lam, supra note 3, at 1232 n.204. In approximately 12 other
states, the legislatures have not adopted a "best interests" standard, but have relied on their courts
to fashion such a standard. Id
71. See, e.g., Day, Termination of Parental Rights Statutes and the Voidfor Vagueness Doc-
trine: A Successful,4ttack on the Parens Patriae Rationale, 16 J. FAM. L. 213 (1977-78); Stiller &
Elder, PINS-A Concept in Need of Supervision, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 33, 45-51 (1974). In
Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Kaufman, J.), a three-judge federal court
held that a New York statute permitting the confinement of "wayward minors" to adult criminal
correctional programs and facilities was unconstitutionally vague.
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with family autonomy, and increase the likelihood of error in assessing
the need for intervention.72 A most telling illustration involves statutes
regulating the so-called status offenses like truancy or failure to obey
parents.7 3 Under these statutes a juvenile may be punished, although
he may have had no idea that his conduct constituted an offense. Like-
wise, many parents may not have adequate notice of what constitutes
actionable abuse or neglect. Vague statutes may also allow the state to
interfere with the exercise of other protected rights.7 4 For example,
broad parental termination provisions might be invoked in cases in-
volving parents who have espoused unpopular views, thereby chilling
first amendment rights.
While the Supreme Court has not invoked the void-for-vagueness
doctrine to invalidate a state parens patriae law governing juvenile de-
linquency,75 and most lower courts have rejected such attacks on these
laws, several lower courts have invalidated child neglect laws on the
basis of the vagueness doctrine.7 6 In light of the traditional deference
to the state in matters involving the family, however, most courts seem
reluctant to overturn or limit state parens patriae laws that are clearly
72. See Comment, supra note 65, at 456.
73. See Ketcham, Why Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders Should be Eliminatedfrain Juivenile
Courts, 57 B.U.L. REv. 645 (1977); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, The Legacy of the Stubborn and
Rebellious Son, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 1097 (1976).
74. See Comment, supra note 65, at 456.
75. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1232-33 & 1233 n.209. The Supreme Court
has consistently refused to address the issue of vagueness in juvenile statutes. See, e.g., Mercado
v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1974); In re Tomisita N., 30
N.Y.2d 927, 287 N.E.2d 377, 335 N.Y.S.2d 683, appeal dsmissedsub nom. In re Negron, 409 U.S.
1052 (1972); Gonzalez v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980).
76. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1233 n.21 1. For example, in Linn v. Linn,
203 Neb. 218,286 N.W.2d 765 (1980), the Nebraska Supreme Court struck down a parental termi-
nation statute because the statute was so vague that parents were not provided with adequate
notice of the kinds of behavior that could trigger state intervention. In Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp.
769 (M.D. Ala. 1976), the federal district court invalidated an Alabama statute which permitted
termination of parental rights when the child was deemed to be "dependent or neglected." In
Conn, a white woman with a child moved in with a black man in a black neighborhood. Al-
though the child showed no signs of physical abuse and was properly cared for, the child, follow-
ing a summary seizure order, was physically removed from his mother's care. The mother's
custody rights were later terminated on the basis of the County Family Court's "factfinding" that
"it was not a healthy thing for a white child to be the only [white] child in a black neighborhood."
Id at 775. A three-judge federal district court concluded that the Alabama statute unconstitution-
ally violated the fundamental right to family integrity, and that the statute was invalid on the basis
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Id at 779-80.
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stated but merely overly broad.7 7 Accordingly, while the vague statutes
now in effect in many states could well be redrafted to achieve greater
specificity and clarity, it seems likely that parents or children seeking
relief from restrictive laws will be required to show that such laws in-
terfere with substantive constitutional rights in order to obtain relief.
C. Substantive Due Process
The state's power to regulate the family derives from the police
power and the parens patriae power. The police power is the general
authority of a state to promote the health, safety, welfare, and morals of
its citizens." Thus, the state under the police power has an interest in
enforcing a variety of laws relating to the family and children, as well
as to the punishment of juvenile criminality. Such laws include statutes
that provide for the termination of the rights of parents to the custody
of their children, 9 and laws restricting the access of minors to abor-
tions and contraceptives.80
At the same time, the state has sought to uphold a variety of restric-
tions on individual choice on the basis of its parens patriae power-the
power of the state to take action to protect those unable to protect
themselves, such as children or incompetents, in "their best interest.""1
The parens patriae concept is limited: it must be exercised only to fur-
ther the best interests of the child, 2 not to promote other social goals.
The state has often asserted an interest in fostering family autonomy,
based on its parens patriae objective of advancing the best interests of
children as well as its police power objective of ensuring the stability of
77. See Developments in the Lan. supra note 3, at 1235.
78. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905).
79. See In re Yardley, 260 Iowa 259, 149 N.W.2d 162 (1967).
80. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (plurality opinion).
81. See Comment, supra note 65, at 451 & n.33; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at
1221-25.
82. See Mnookin, Child-Ctustod Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indetermi-
nacy" LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226; Developments in the Law, supra note 3.
at 1232 n.204. Two other limitations on the exercise of the parens patriae power can be readily
discerned. First, since the parens patriae concept is based on the presumption that children lack
the mental competence and maturity possessed by adults, see Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 255
(1979), children who are both competent and mature possess fundamental rights that may be
unconstitutionally abridged by the state acting under the color of its parens patriae power. Sec-
ond, the state must show that the child's parents are either unfit, unable or unwilling to care for
the child adequately. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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society.83
State deference to family autonomy is mandated not only by the
practical constraints on the state's ability to achieve these objectives in
other ways, but also by constitutional limits on its power to impose a
preferred test of substantive values and beliefs on its citizens.8 4 At the
same time, we must keep in mind the distinction between state action to
further its interests in promoting family autonomy and state action to
reinforce parental authority. This distinction is crucial for resolving
cases in which the interests of the child and parent are in conflict. Pro-
fessor Tribe has noted that the state's interest in reserving certain deci-
sions to the family is conceptually distinct from its interest in choosing
which family member should have the authority to make a particular
decision. The authority of parents is grounded upon two fundamen-
tal assumptions: first, that parents possess what a child lacks in judg-
ment and maturity, and second, that parents will act in the best
interests of their children.86 To the extent that these assumptions are
unfounded, there is less support for the state interest in deferring to
parents in matters concerning the family. These principles would seem
to lead to the logical conclusion that there should be significant limita-
tions on the state's power to reinforce parental dominance over mature
and competent children. Moreover, state intervention is only war-
ranted when the potential detriment to the child caused by remaining
in the family in which the parents neglect or abuse him or her would be
serious enough to overcome the substantial harm inevitably caused by
disrupting or terminating the child's parental ties.87
While intervention in areas of juvenile delinquency and abuse and
neglect may further state objectives, the other side of the coin is that
such action also may unreasonably impair constitutionally protected
interests of the child and parent. As long ago as 1923, the Supreme
Court in Meyer v. Nebraska88 declared that the Constitution protects
83. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1213-16. Under most circumstances, how-
ever, parents are better qualified than the state to promote the best interests of their own children.
See J. G OLDSTEIN, A. FREUD AND A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973).
84. See Kaufman, supra note 15, at 1025-28; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1213.
85. Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, Foreword to The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-41 (1973).
86. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1219 & nn.139-40 (citing Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584 (1979)).
87. See Areen, supra note 21, at 919; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1237-38.
88. 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (dictum).
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the rights of minors as well as adults. Since that time, the Court has
specified a wide variety of constitutional protections enjoyed by mi-
nors, including the right to equal protection against discrimination on
the basis of races9 or legitimacy,9" the right to freedom of speech,9' and
to the procedural safeguards of due process in both criminal 92 and civil
proceedings. 93 Most importantly, the due process clause protects the
child from many forms of state interference with the family structure,
on the ground that the child has a protectible interest in receiving con-
structive parental guidance.94 As we shall see, in deciding cases involv-
ing the rights of children, courts have had to resolve two somewhat
contradictory versions of the appropriate objective for guaranteeing the
constitutional safeguards of children. On the one hand is the concept
that, at least in areas touching upon fundamental rights, the child has a
right to autonomous development. On the other is the notion that the
child has the right to receive the benefit of parental guidance and
control.
Parents also have constitutionally secured rights. The Supreme
Court has recognized as fundamental the right of parental autonomy in
activities relating to marriage, 95 procreation, 96 contraception, 97 abor-
89. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
90. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (disallowance of intestate succession
from father); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (denial of social security benefits to some
illegitimate children of disabled parents).
91. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (prohibi-
tion against wearing of black armbands in public school to protest United States involvement in
Vietnam violated first and fourteenth amendments); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory pledge of allegiance to the flag violated first and fourteenth
amendments).
92. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy clause prevents prosecu-
tion in criminal court following adjudicatory proceedings in juvenile court); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required when a juvenile was charged with an
act that would be a crime if committed by an adult). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
93. See, e.g.. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension from high school cannot be
imposed without some rudiments of due process, including notice and a hearing); Garvey, supra
note 51, at 779-83. The Court also has fashioned the boundaries of a minor's right to privacy,
eliminating or modifying many state-imposed restrictions on access to abortions, see Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), and to contra-
ceptives, see Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), even where both the State and
the parents oppose the exercise of the minor's choice.
94. See. e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER),
431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
95. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
96. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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tion,98 family relationships,99 and the rearing and education of
children. '00
It is a commonplace that when a state seeks to regulate conduct fall-
ing within the ambit of fundamental rights, the state regulation is con-
stitutionally permissible only when the statute may be justified by a
compelling state interest, and the statute is restrictively drawn so as to
further only that state interest.' 0' Parens patriae laws are not different.
Accordingly, highly generalized appeals to the characteristics of the
young-presumed lack of competence and maturity-will not alone be
sufficient to justify encroachment upon the fundamental rights of par-
ent and child.'02 In Wisconsin . Yoder, 03 for example, the Supreme
Court held a state compulsory high school education statute unconsti-
tutional on the ground that it denied Amish parents the right to raise
their children in accordance with their religious principles. In Yoder,
the Court ruled that the challenged statute did not serve a compelling
police power or parens patriae objective because there was no showing
of "harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public
safety, peace, order or welfare."'"
In sum, state parens patriae laws will not pass constitutional muster
97. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
98. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
100. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923). The constitutional stature of rights concerning the family is most directly traced
to these two cases. In Meyer, a schoolteacher challenged his conviction pursuant to a statute
forbidding the teaching during the first eight grades of any modern language other than English.
262 U.S. at 396-98. In Pierce, the challenged statute required all children to attend public schools,
268 U.S. at 530. The Supreme Court found both statutes violative of due process as infringements
of the liberty interest of parents in raising and educating their children.
Since Meyer and Pierce, courts have placed constitutional restraints on state interference with
traditional family activities such as child-rearing. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), for
instance, the Supreme Court held that a state may not deny an unwed father custody of his child
without a hearing, noting that the integrity of the family unit has long been afforded constitutional
protection and that the right to raise one's children is essential. Id at 651. The Court has recog-
nized family integrity as a fundamental right protected by the due process clause on two theories:
as a "liberty" interest, see Comment, supra note 65, at 450 (citing Meyer and Pierce) and as a
privacy right, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
101. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See generally Developments in the Law, supra
note 3, at 1236.
102. L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1079 (1978).
103. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
104. Id at 230.
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if they encroach upon the fundamental right to family integrity,' 5 un-
less the state can demonstrate that the statute in question is narrowly
drawn to achieve a compelling state interest. A number of courts have
struck down state parens patriae laws with this analysis. In Roe v.
Conn,"0 6 a federal district court concluded that an Alabama child ne-
glect statute providing for the termination of parental rights if the child
"has no proper parental care" violated substantive due process. The
court noted that the state can "sever entirely the parent-child relation-
ship only when the child is subjected to real physical or emotional
harm and less drastic measures would be unavailing."'0 7 There is
growing recognition that the broad abuse and neglect statutes in force
in many states are vulnerable to attack for failing to meet these
requisites.' 08
While these guarantees set the basic contours for a fair and workable
juvenile justice system, they are insufficient to bring about the needed
reform. The constitutional limitations are in essence negative re-
105. If there is a fundamental right to family integrity, the question arises as to what kinds of
family relationships are deserving of heightened constitutional protection. The substantive due
process decisions upholding the basic rights of parents to direct the upbringing and education of
their children have focused on the traditional role of the parents in these matters. See Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Note, Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Scope of State Child Neglect Statutes, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 723 (1979). It might be
argued, then, that the constitutional limitations on coercive state intervention into the family
should apply only to the traditional immediate family. Id at 722-27.
The Supreme Court appears to have rejected such a rigid limitation. In Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the Court stated that an extended family, consisting of a grand-
mother and her two grandsons, enjoyed the same constitutional protection from a local zoning
ordinance as the immediate family. Id at 504-06. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816 (1977), the Court concluded that the foster family
serves the same interests as the traditional family. While the Court did not directly hold that
foster parents have a liberty interest in the custody of their children protected by the fourteenth
amendment, it did decide that even if they did have such a liberty interest, the challenged proce-
dure for the removal of foster children was constitutional. Id at 842-47. While the Court in
Moore stressed that the extended family was firmly grounded in "history and tradition," 431 U.S.
at 503-04, the Court in both Moore and OFFER viewed the family unit in question as the func-
tional equivalent of the traditional family unit. Accordingly, it would seem that relationships
serving the same functions as the traditional family deserve the same protection from state inter-
ference. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1216.
106. 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
107. Id at 779.
108. If the right to family integrity means the right to be free from coercive state intervention
except where such intervention is necessary to promote the interests of the child, then the abuse
and neglect statutes should be restricted to authorize intervention only where the demonstrable
harm of nonintervention is greater than the ill effects of intervention.
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straints. With the exception of the notice and hearing requirements of
procedural due process, the constitutional limitations fail to provide ju-
venile authorities with guidelines for combating juvenile crime and
child abuse. The constitutional guarantees leave many unanswered
questions including: what procedures- should be used, which deci-
sionmakers should decide various categories of cases, and what reme-
dies and sanctions should be available?
IV. TRANSLATING CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES INTO
MEANINGFUL REFORM
A. The Juvenile Justice Standards Project
. Background
An effective and humane juvenile justice system must respond to the
child's developmental needs by fostering the role of the family and also
must protect those juveniles whose interests are threatened by their par-
ents.'0 9 For the last ten years I have chaired the IJA-ABA Joint Com-
mission of the Juvenile Justice Project. The Project, which has drawn
upon the resources of leading psychiatrists, sociologists, penologists,
family court judges, law professors, and practicing attorneys (including
three former ABA presidents)," 0 has long understood that piecemeal
solutions cannot solve the problems of the juvenile justice system.
The efforts of the Joint Commission have produced twenty-three
published volumes of substantive standards and a summary volume.
,The Commission dealt with the full range of issues such as detention,
dispositions, sanctions, status offenses, abuse and neglect, and the pro-
cedures governing the adjudication of juvenile cases that are consistent
with the basic constitutional guarantees of the child and parent. Sum-
marizing the Standards in their entirety is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, and runs the risk of oversimplifcation and distortion. I will,
however, outline a few of the innovations recommended by the Stan-
dards which could remedy many flaws in the juvenile justice system.
2. Rights of Minors
The problems stemming from the nearly unfettered discretion of
those dealing with juveniles in trouble highlight the need for greater
109. Kaufman, supra note 15, at 1021.
110. Id at 1018.
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specificity of the rights of juveniles. A right has meaning only if its
boundaries can be described. The Standards attempt to bring clarity to
the vague generalities of the constitutional guarantees afforded minors
by defining the boundaries of their rights. In the Rights of Minors vol-
ume, the Standards propose that "legislatively created, [and] narrowly
drawn""' solutions be devised to address specific problems. In place
of vague statutory generalities, uninfluenced by the conflicting interests
of child, parent, and state, the Standards give detailed treatment to the
scope of a minor's rights, such as the right to receive support, 12 to pro-
cure medical care in the absence of parental consent, 1 3 to obtain em-
ployment,' 14 and to sign contracts." 5
For example, tension between the interests of the parent and the in-
terests of the child may occur in the context of the delivery of medical
services. When the minor lives at home, his or her parents are likely to
be sensitive to the needs of the child and provide for adequate treat-
ment. But when he or she lives away from home, the adolescent has
become an autonomous individual in society, and under the Standards,
may consent to medical treatment as if he or she were an adult. 16
When the child remains at home, the Standards carefully delineate the
circumstances in which he or she may receive medical treatment with-
out prior parental notification or consent. Emergency treatment,'17
treatment for drug addiction," 8 venereal disease, contraception, and
pregnancy, 19 are a few illustrations.
Through specific statutory provisions, the rights of juveniles and par-
ents may be balanced and protected where vague constitutional guar-
antees are ineffective. At the same time, the Standards contain
provisions which are responsive to the increasing maturity of the child
as he or she progresses through adolescence. Deference to family au-
tonomy is most clearly justified during the child's early years because
the family cannot provide needed support unless it is aware of the
111. IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE RIGHTS OF MINORS
2.1(B) (1980).
112. Id at 3.1-.4.
113. Id at 4.1-.9.
114. Id at 5.1-.8.
115. Id at 6.1.
116. Id at 4.4.
117. Id at 4.5. See Kaufman, supra note 15, at 1022.
118. UA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, STANDARDS RELATING TO RIGHTS OF MINORS 4.7
(1980).
119. Id at 4.8.
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child's illness. 120
3. 4buse and Neglect
The interests of parent and child may of course conflict with greater
impact when the parents are accused of abusing or neglecting the child.
At first blush this appears to be the easiest case for state intervention.
Here, the parents seem to have abrogated their responsibility for the
healthy upbringing of the child. It would appear, therefore, that the
state, as parens patriae, may justifiably intervene in the best interests of
the child. The severity of the sanction of terminating the parent-child
relationship and removing the child from his home, however, makes it
imperative that the state observe strict procedural safeguards in abuse
and neglect proceedings.
Drafting appropriate guidelines to govern coercive state intervention
in the abuse and neglect area proved one of the most controversial and
difficult tasks of the Project. While some commentators have advo-
cated deference to the discretion and presumed expertise of judges and
social workers in deciding when and how to intervene in cases of
abused and neglected children,' 2 ' others have concluded that broad,
vague laws ultimately lead to haphazard intervention harmful to chil-
dren.'22 The Standards, I believe, correctly perceive the dangers of
both extremes. Recognizing that many children need state protection
but that coercive intervention is not always the best treatment, the
Standards on Abuse and Neglect attempt to provide a sound frame-
work for coercive state intervention on behalf of abused or neglected
children that is sensitive both to the needs of children and to the limits
120. Id at 4.1. See Id, Commentary to 4.1, at 50. Moreover, a child during these years is less
capable of protecting his own interests, and more in need of his parent's guidance. When a juve-
nile needs medical assistance because he or she has venereal disease or is pregnant, for example,
the juvenile has, at least in a biological sense, achieved a certain level of maturity. Accordingly,
the Standards recognize that in these circumstances, a requirement of parental consent would be
inconsistent with the increasing maturity of the minor in trouble, and could result in a failure to
obtain needed treatment. Id at 4.8. See id, Commentary to 4.8, at 72; Kaufman, supra note 15,
at 1023; Note, The Minors' Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L.
REv. 305, 312 (1974). In structurng such compromises between the interests of parents and the
interests of the child in various contexts, the reforms proposed by the Standards reflect the needs
of both during the child's development. By adopting a flexible and pragmatic approach, the Stan-
dards recognize that no single solution is feasible for the myriad of circumstances in which the
child may need the assistance of the law.
121. S. KATz, supra note 22, at 64-65.
122. Mnookin, supra note 80, at 226.
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of coercive intervention.12 3
The central tenet of the Standards on Abuse and Neglect is that a
system of coercive intervention on behalf of endangered children
should be based on a strong presumption in favor of family and paren-
tal rearing.'24 Judges and lawyers in New York note that the family
court, at times unwittingly, contributes to family disintegration and ju-
venile crime by removing children from their homes and placing them
in foster homes or institutions. Only when the child's welfare is endan-
gered and interference is necessary for the child's protection may the
state intervene against the parents' wishes. 25 This standard is consis-
tent with the range of constitutionally permissible state actions to rem-
edy the problems of child abuse and neglect: the state's parens patriae
power justifies intervention only when the harm to the child of nonin-
tervention outweighs the harm of intervention. Accordingly, the re-
quirement of a showing of demonstrable harm to justify coercive
intervention ensures that such action will be predicated upon a legiti-
mate state interest.
The Standards also meet the void-for-vagueness concerns critics
have raised with reference to many state abuse and neglect statutes.
The Standards on Abuse and Neglect enumerate, with particularity, the
statutory grounds for intervention. These include specific showings of
physical harm or injury, emotional damage, sexual abuse, need for
medical treatment, and delinquent acts by the child committed with
parental encouragement or approval. 126 The Standards also seek to
prevent decisionmakers from intervening simply because the child is
from a culture with different values.
Included in the comprehensive scheme for state intervention are pro-
visions for improvement in the reporting of child abuse,' 27 emergency
temporary custody of endangered children, 28 court-ordered provisions
123. IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, INTRODUCTION TO STANDARDS RELATING TO
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2 (1981)- Kaufman, supra note 15, at 1026.
124. IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT
!1 (1981). See id, Commentary to 1.1, at 49-50.
125. Id at 1.2. See id, Commentary to 1.2, at 50-51.
126. Id at 2.1.
127. Id at 3.1-.5. See also Bourne & Newberger, "Family Autonomy" or "Coercive Interven-
tion"? Ambiguio ' and Conflict in the Proposed Standards for Child Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U.L.
REV. 671 (1977).
128. IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT
4.1-.4 (1981).
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for services within the home, removal of the child, 2 9 criminal prosecu-
tion of parents, 130 and voluntary placement of an endangered child. 13 1
The greatest contribution of the Project, however, is the proposal of a
comprehensive system based on three fundamental principles: (1) pref-
erence for preservation of family autonomy, (2) recognition of the pri-
macy of the child's interest when it conflicts with the parents', and
(3) coercive state intervention to remedy only specific harms. 132 The
presumption in favor of family autonomy safeguards the parents' tradi-
tional right to custody and control of their child, and recognizes that
the child is most likely to develop in the care of those who have raised
him or her since birth. The Standards thus acknowledge the limits of
law-that familial bonds cannot be easily replicated by a court-ordered
substitute. But, it is to be noted, the Standards also recognize that def-
erence to parental autonomy may not always be in a child's best inter-
ests: at times state intervention will be necessary and preferred to
protect the child and, presumably, to interrupt the cycle through which
the abused or neglected child ultimately grows up to become the abu-
sive or neglectful parent.' 33 Nearly half of the first-time delinquents in
the New York Family Court have been there before, often as victims of
child abuse or neglect and usually in cases not resolved by the court.
Accordingly, the Standards must permit intervention in appropriate
cases to ensure that today's abused child will not become tomorrow's
criminal. The Standards' requirement that the court may intervene
only in those cases in which the child has suffered specific harm should
redress the major shortcoming of the abuse and neglect laws discussed
above. Intervention, in the past, too frequently has been based upon
highly subjective judgments concerning parental unfitness or improper
home conditions without a requirement that the child is being or is
about to be harmed.
4. Noncriminal Misbehavior
Most juvenile courts have jurisdiction over cases involving antisocial
but noncriminal misbehavior, such as truancy, running away from
home, incorrigibility, ungovernability or waywardness, idleness, and
129. Id at 6.1-.6, 7.1-.5, 8.1-.7.
130. Id at 9.1.
131. Id at 10.1-.8.
132. Id at 1.1, 1.2, 1.5. See also Bourne & Newberger, Supra note 127, at 671.
133. See Bourne & Newberger, supra note 127, at 672.
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habitual disobedience. 3 4 Studies indicate that as many as one-half of
the cases heard in juvenile courts involve conduct that would not be
punishable if committed by an adult. The juvenile court's jurisdiction
over status offenders-so-called because jurisdiction is generally based
upon the child's condition rather than on the commission of specific
acts-rests on a number of dubious assumptions: that parents who turn
ungovernable children over to the state are acting in the best interests
of the child, that unruly children can be controlled through state inter-
vention, that state action should at all times support parental authority
over disobedient children, that noncriminal misbehavior by youths is
likely to lead to future criminal behavior, and that coercive interven-
tion will be an effective remedy.135
The argument advanced has been that minors have a right not to
liberty but to custody; therefore, the state's intervention merely replaces
the natural custody of parents.136 This contention is not satisfying. For
children, the rehabilitative ideal has been a chimera; the juvenile jus-
tice system has allowed as much juvenile crime to breed as it has pre-
vented. For adolescents, this response is especially inadequate.
According to the best contemporary evidence, moral and intellectual
capacities do not change substantially after age fourteen.137 This obser-
vation weakens the justification for blind deference to the interest of
promoting the bonds of the family. The core interest of the juvenile
remains his right to liberty, which is subject to extensive interference by
the juvenile court in its exercise of status offense jurisdiction.
Ironically, the juvenile's liberty interest often is impaired more se-
verely when the court treats him as a status offender than when he is
treated as a juvenile delinquent. A recent study of New York's family
court system confirms the pressing need to limit the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court over status offenders and to develop guidelines for im-
posing sanctions.'38 Coupled with the absence of clear standards gov-
erning the imposition of sanctions, a problem addressed below, the
dual responsibility of New York Family Court judges for status offend-
ers and juvenile delinquents has led to the inequitable result that those
134. See Gregory, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Over Noncriminal Misbehavior: The Argument
Against Abolition, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 242, 244 (1978).
135. IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, INTRODUCTION TO STANDARDS RELATING TO
NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 3 (1982).
136. See Kaufman, supra note 6, at 1058.
137. Id
138. Shipp, Family Court: 4 Case of Troubled Justice, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
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who commit minor noncriminal acts or status offenses often are treated
more severely than those accused of delinquency. For example, the
study found that New York Family Court judges placed under supervi-
sion nine percent of the youngsters charged with status offenses such as
truancy or failure to obey their parents, nearly twice the number of
adjudicated delinquents placed under supervision.'39 In 1980, only
2.18% of all juvenile delinquents appearing in New York Family Court
were placed in secure institutions.
The Standards provide a solution to these problems by proposing the
elimination of status offense jurisdiction now vested in juvenile courts
and substitution of largely voluntary referral services outside the juve-
nile justice system.'40 The principal problems underlying status of-
fenses, such as disobedience of parents and running away from home,
are more likely to be solved by a comprehensive system of investiga-
tion, referral and counseling than by the piecemeal adjudication of of-
fenses that now seem to end in a cul-de-sac. By positing that services
can be most effectively provided at the onset of the problem, the Stan-
dards attempt to reach problem children while they can still be assisted,
rather than weeks or months later in a formal proceeding and long af-
ter attitudes and positions have hardened.' 4 '
139. Id This phenomenon may be explained in part by the fact that evidence may be admis-
sible at a PINS hearing that would not be admissible in the trial of a delinquent, and also because
a lower standard of proof is required than the reasonable doubt standard made applicable by
Winshop to juvenile delinquency proceedings. IJA/ABA STANDARDS, Supra note 4, INTRODUC-
TION TO STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 7 (1982).
140. Id at 1.1. See id, Commentary to 1.1, at 35-41.
141. In keeping with the presumption favoring family autonomy, and the pragmatic recogni-
tion that people cannot be coerced into rehabilitation, see Kaufman, supra note 28, at 1470-71, the
Standards recommend that all crisis intervention and other services should be offered on a volun-
tary basis. The juvenile and the family cannot be compelled to receive such services in cases
involving unruly and antisocial behavior which does not violate the criminal law. The Standards,
of course, recognize that there are some cases in which limited state intervention is desirable for
the health and protection of the child. Youths who run away and lack even a temporary haven,
children who are in immediate jeopardy, and those who require emergency medical services are
prime candidates for such attention. In such cases, the Standards permit procedures for tempo-
rary custody to evaluate or treat, while precluding a determination of wardship which would
permit prolonged detention. UA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, Standards Relating to Non-
criminal Misbehavior 6.1-.7 (1982). Such provisions carve out only limited exceptions to the prin-
ciple that rehabilitation can be best carried out in the context of the family, and recognize the
inherent limitations of confinement of juveniles in secure or jail facilities for noncriminal misbe-
havior. Confinement is frequently less effective than other measures, is costlier than other proce-
dures, leads to isolation, family breakdown and destruction of self-image, and often exacerbates
the problems that lead to juvenile delinquency. Gilman, IJ/ AB,4A Juvenile Justice Standards
Project: An Introduction, 47 B.U.L. REV. 617, 624 (1977).
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In addition to eliminating status offense jurisdiction, the Standards
offer other proposals for improving the juvenile justice system's ability
to deal fairly with the problem of juvenile criminality. In 1977, the
Standards suggested prohibiting the imposition of sanctions for "con-
duct that is not intended to cause, and does not cause or risk, injury to
the personal or property interests of another."1 42 The Standards seek to
place strict limitations on the duration of the state's intervention into
the lives of children in trouble. 43 This approach marks a significant
improvement in the traditional model of juvenile justice, which has
used indeterminate sentencing to retain state control over the juvenile
until he is "cured" or until he reaches the age of majority. 144 The Stan-
dards structure a scheme of determinate sentencing, based on the prin-
ciple that the severity of the sanction must be proportionate to the
seriousness of the offense. 145 If adopted, these innovations would pro-
vide the most comprehensive study for reform and the basic framework
for a juvenile justice system in which intrusive dispositions are kept to a
minimum. Juvenile officials, however, retain the authority to intervene
to protect society from dangerous youngsters and children from cruel
parents.
Moreover, there is a great need for serious reexamination of the se-
crecy requirement in juvenile and family courts. In New York, as in
most states, a minor's criminal record and other court records are kept
secret because the state law is based on the premise that confidentiality
is necessary for the minor's rehabilitation. Secrecy is so pervasive in
the system that all participants, from the policeman and the teacher to
142, IJA/ABA STANDARDS, .spra note 4, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND SANCTIONS 2.4 (Tent. ed. 1977) (omitted in 1980 draft). See Kaufman, supra note
15, at 1030.
143. IA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND SANCTIONS 5.2, 6.2 (1980). See Kaufman, supra note 15, at 1030.
144. See Kaufman, supra note 15, at 1030-31 & 1031 n.100.
145. IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND SANCTIONS 5.1-.2 (1980). See id § 6.2 (Tent. ed. 1977). Moreover, in choosing a
particular sanction, the juvenile court judge is directed to select the least restrictive or drastic
alternative appropriate to the seriousness of the offense. Id, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPoSI-
TIONS 2.1 (1980). If the judge imposes a restrictive disposition in a case involving a juvenile
offender, he or she must state in writing the reasons for the finding that less drastic remedies are
inappropriate or inadequate to further the purposes of the juvenile justice system. Id, Commen-
tary to 12.D, at 22 (Tent. ed. 1977). Finally, the Standards establish strict criteria for the waiver of
juvenile court jurisdiction in order to regulate the transfer ofjuveniles who commit serious crimi-
nal offenses to adult criminal court. Id, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFERS BETWEEN
COURTS (1980).
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the judge, are kept in the dark over the record of the child's criminal
conduct in the other official's possession. The argument for confidenti-
ality is persuasive in cases of noncriminal misbehavior or abuse and
neglect, where the state is not attempting to punish a child for serious
antisocial conduct. When an adolescent has committed a crime, how-
ever, society's interest in full information is deserving of much greater
protection. Accordingly, information relating to juvenile delinquency
adjudications should not be withheld from judges who must shape dis-
positions responsive to all the interests at stake or from school officials
who are responsible for dealing with the troubled child in the school
environment. Increased access to information concerning juvenile
crimes would help relieve one central shortcoming of the present sys-
tem. In sum, the juvenile justice system's left hand does not seem to
know what its right hand is doing.
B. Proposals for Reform
The discussion of constitutional and statutory reforms highlights one
central theme-that all actions taken by society in addressing the
problems of the juvenile involve a delicate balance among the interests
of child, parent, and state. The need for such balancing arises in all
types of cases, including abuse and neglect and juvenile delinquency
proceedings, and at all stages of the process through the intake stage to
the dispositional or sentencing stage. The uniform application of a set
of clear standards to further society's interests in reducing the incidence
of child abuse and juvenile crime requires an institutional framework
capable of identifying the problems of those brought before them, gath-
ering and applying relevant information, and coordinating the re-
sources allocated to juvenile justice. Critics have universally asserted
that the underlying structural weakness of the juvenile justice system is
a lack of coordination. This lack of coordination has infected all as-
pects of the juvenile process. There is confusion in the roles and re-
sponsibilities of judges, social workers, counsel, service agencies and
other personnel. There are gaps in jurisdiction and defects in the deliv-
ery of services. This contributes heavily to the failure to achieve the
twin objectives of protecting society from juvenile crime and helping
children and their families. 46 The story of the seventeen-year-old
murderer, which I briefly mentioned at the outset, is a tragic but accu-
146. Id, Introduction, at 3 (rent. ed. 1977).
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rate illustration of the shortcomings of a system that allows juvenile
offenders and neglected children to pass through the cracks of the juve-
nile justice labyrinth because of its lack of coordination. In that case,
the juvenile officials who treated him as an emotionally disturbed child
and the officials charged with the responsibility of dealing with him as
a juvenile offender were working in complete isolation. Furthermore,
his family was not involved in the process because he became so incor-
rigible that they no longer wanted any communication with him. Trag-
ically, the murder followed his release from custody upon the
recommendation of psychiatrists and social workers.
What is needed is institutional change to develop inter-connections
within the system for the purposes of eliminating gaps and duplication
in services and coordinating the operation and monitoring of all pro-
grams affecting the juvenile. New York City Schools Chancellor Frank
J. Macchiarola has stressed the need for coordination between the
schools and juvenile agencies. The schools cannot achieve this goal
alone. It is difficult enough for schools to serve educational needs, let
alone combat juvenile crime and child abuse. Others suggest reforms
which would add a new program-such as vocational counseling, drug
and alcohol prevention programs, or psychological counseling-to the
disparate segments of the existing system.
The linchpin of comprehensive reform, I believe, would be the crea-
tion of a unified administrative agency either as an adjunct to the juve-
nile court or to the concerned agency. It would coordinate society's
remedial efforts in all aspects of the child's interaction with the legal
and social structure. One of the shortcomings of the present system is
the poorly defined roles of the participants in the system. At the pres-
ent time, it is unclear whether social workers and psychiatrists are to
serve only the interests of the child (and if so, whether that interest is
liberty or a right to treatment), or whether they have been charged with
a responsibility to society as well. The assignment of counsel to chil-
dren in light of Gault and its progeny raises similar questions about the
efficacy of counsel for individuals whose betterment may not necessar-
ily be effectuated by lawyers accustomed to the adversary system and
advocacy of narrowly defined legal rights. Judges themselves are often
too over-burdened by the pressures of heavy caseloads to have suffi-
cient time to devise dispostions that truly serve the rehabilitative and
other goals of the juvenile justice system. In short, there is a pressing
need to place substantial responsibility in the hands of neutral and dis-
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passionate individuals sensitive to the oftentimes conflicting interests of
child, parent, and state. Officials are needed who can play a crucial
role at the initial stage of a juvenile's contact with the system and in-
volve the family in the process of rehabilitation.
Accordingly, I would suggest that as a first step, juvenile cases should
be assigned to a select group of officials acting as supervisors or coor-
dinators within this unified juvenile justice system. Trained impartial
coordinators often can encourage solutions that cannot be achieved
when parties with opposing views interact by themselves. A family
with a child who is a suspected juvenile offender may not be receptive
to suggestions from social workers or juvenile judges becauge they are
embarrassed that they have a problem child, or they may perceive that
the social worker is only the advocate of the child's interests. As a re-
sult, these coordinators could serve as intermediaries whose proven
neutrality would allow them to suggest and negotiate dispositions ac-
ceptable to all the parties, including the families in whose care the
problem child is most likely to remain. To ensure the selection of indi-
viduals who have the confidence of the public, I would suggest that
they be appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of a panel
or commission which would be composed of individuals from many
disciplines, including the legal profession, the social sciences, govern-
ment, and law enforcement.
The use of coordinators in many types of cases would help relieve
the pressures on overburdened courts. In his Annual Report on the
State of the Judiciary, Chief Justice Burger recently suggested that
there is a pressing need to find "alternate dispute-solving methods" in
child custody, adoption, and divorce cases, among others, to reduce the
flood of litigation in the courts. My proposal offers a concrete means of
achieving this goal.
The present crisis in our nation's family and juvenile courts suggests
that substantial responsibility or authority over a broad range of mat-
ters should be vested in the centralized oversight mechanism recom-
mended. The coordinators should have original jurisdiction over cases
of abuse and neglect, proceedings in which it is likely that there will be
a battle for custody of a child, and cases involving status offenders such
as truants and others enumerated. These are all instances in which the
appropriate focus is necessarily the family, and the coordinators could
serve an important function in attempting to devise a solution within
the family context. The courts could exercise judicial review over the
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institution's decisions, as courts do over administrative agencies, to de-
termine whether the agency's action is arbitrary and capricious.1 47 If
the juvenile in trouble has repeated contact with the law, the coordina-
tor will have become familiar with the problems facing both the child
and the family. Accordingly, continued responsibility may yield the
expertise required for suggesting successful measures for rehabilitation.
Even in cases involving crimes over which the courts could retain origi-
nal jurisdiction, the suggested special agency's staff could discuss the
child's problems with the family and make a recommendation to the
courts for an appropriate disposition.
The countless continued and persistent failings of the juvenile justice
system make clear one fundmental truth: that forced intervention is
doomed to fail when it involves efforts to coerce compliance with stan-
dards of behavior defined by the coercer alone.14 What must be found
is a way to convince troubled children and families that they are an
important part of the process of their own rehabilitation. The coordi-
nator-a label we attach temporarily---could rely on special tools to
help troubled children and families chart their own destiny. Perhaps
the most serious fallacy in efforts to remedy the problems of child
abuse and juvenile criminality is the assumption that these problems
could be solved merely through post hoc intervention by the state.
Such belated action results in a determination that an individual's be-
havior is socially unacceptable, but history teaches that it would not
offer a prescription for future behavior based on the consent of all
involved.
To redress this shortcoming, I would suggest that the coordinator to
whom a case has been assigned, a case which involves abuse or miscon-
duct not warranting removal of the child or institutionalization, work
with the family in devising a "contract" or "agreement" specifically set-
ting forth the terms of permissible and impermissible behavior. The
coordinator would first discuss the problem with the parents and the
juvenile to expose fully the roots of the difficulty-whether neglect,
child abuse, antisocial behavior by the juvenile, or rebellion and so
forth. This discussion should reveal areas of agreement and disagree-
ment. Acceptable arrangements could be reached on curfews, responsi-
147. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1026 (4th Cir.), a'dinpart, rev'd
inpart on other grounds, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (citing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1976)).
148. See Kaufman, supra note 28, at 1470-71.
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bilities of parents, parents' expectations for the child, and other
concerns. An agreement, memorialized in written form, could set up
schedules for visitation if parents separate, and set forth restrictions on
parents in abuse and neglect cases. This process of discussion and ne-
gotiation would encourage the juvenile to play an active role in sug-
gesting terms of the agreement. He would acquire the feeling that he is
a part of the system at work, and be less inclined to rebel against au-
thority. By articulating his needs, the juvenile would permit the coor-
dinator to draft provisions fashioned in light of both the juvenile's
suggestions and the realistic limits of the parents.
Thus, the agreement may serve a number of functions. The drafting
process itself is beneficial in discussing misunderstandings, venting an-
ger, and communicating expectations. Once memorialized in writing,
the agreement forces parents to act consistently with the express terms,
provides the juvenile with a clearer sense of his freedoms and limita-
tions voluntarily agreed to, and preserves a record of the case in the
event that the juvenile must return to the coordinator or court. Of
course, the agreement could be modified should circumstances change.
In such a system, the state would not simply be coercively intervening
in the family, but would be providing a means of structuring a mutual
agreement between members of a troubled family.
The use of coordinators and family contracts can provide an im-
portant first step to correct a crazy-quilt juvenile justice system. After
all is said in debates, there still remains the basic principle that the
child must learn to cope as a member of a society that expects him or
her to function as a responsible person. In some instances this requires
support of the family and other institutions to guide the minor's devel-
opment. In still other cases, the state must intervene to protect the ju-
venile from those who endanger his or her interests. Through the
constitutional, statutory, and institutional reforms I have discussed, so-
ciety can achieve the delicate balancing of interests.
We can be sure of one thing-the present disjointed and uncoordi-
nated system has proven its inability to cope with the growing criminal
and non-criminal problems of our adolescents. The suggestions pro-
posed in the Juvenile Justice Standards and here may offer a glimmer
of hope for leading us from the dense thicket of our depressing failures.
Of course, there are no guarantees. But, as Learned Hand phrased it:
By some happy fortuity, man is a projector, a designer, a builder, a
craftsman; it is among his most dependable joys to impose upon the
[Vol. 60:743
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss3/2
Number 3] MEMORIAL LECTURE 777
flux that passes before him some mark of himself, aware though he
always must be of the odds against him. His reward is not so much
in the work as in the making; not so much in the prize as in the
race. 149
If our commitment is firm, the dream of juvenile justice reform may yet
become a reality.
149. L. HAND, A Fanfarefor Prometheus, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 291, 297 (I. Dilliard ed.
1960).
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